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I. Introduction
As Gideon v. Wainwright1 turns fifty, it shows its age. One
cannot exactly call Gideon a failure, as it has spread defense
counsel to nearly all felony cases, as well as many misdemeanor
cases.2 But it has hardly been a ringing success. Caseloads keep
 Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Thanks to Ben Barton, Josh Bowers, Brandon Garrett, J.D. King, Robin
Steinberg, and fellow participants in the Gideon at 50: Reassessing the Right to
Counsel Symposium at the Washington and Lee University School of Law for
their helpful discussion and comments.
1. 372 U.S. 335, 342–44 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires states to appoint defense counsel for indigent criminal defendants). But
see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (establishing an actualimprisonment limitation on the right to counsel).
2. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1972) (extending
Gideon to any offense that results in imprisonment). In one study, more than
ninety-nine percent of state and federal inmates surveyed were represented by
counsel on the offense for which they were imprisoned; two-thirds of federal
inmates and more than four-fifths of state inmates had court-appointed counsel.
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increasing far faster than budgets, spreading resources thinner
and thinner. Underfunding and lack of support are chronic
problems, stemming from political hostility or indifference to
criminal defendants and the difficulty of guaranteeing funding
sources, particularly ones that keep pace with steadily rising
caseloads.3
As a result, many defendants may have lawyers in name
only, meeting with them for only five minutes—perhaps in a
holding cell right before a court hearing—before being told to
plead guilty at the initial appearance or soon thereafter. In the
typical case, lawyers do little or no independent investigation to
ferret out the truth or challenge the prosecution’s version of
events. Indeed, the defense may not even await the prosecution’s
discovery before immediately compromising on a guilty plea.4
That is Potemkin lawyering, a costly charade far removed from
Gideon’s vision.
While in theory the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel
be minimally effective,5 in practice it does not. To avoid
overturning convictions in droves, the Supreme Court has
watered down the definition of effective assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment, so any “lawyer with a pulse will be
deemed effective.”6 As too many cases chase too few lawyers with
too little funding, the inevitable result is chronic ineffectiveness.
The standard response of academics has been to lament this
situation and to call for a new law or more aggressive litigation
and constitutional challenges.7 Lawyers, they urge, are essential
CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES, NCJ 179023, at 1 (2000).
3. See NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N, SECURING REASONABLE
CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 12–19 (2011).
4. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging AppointedCounsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 975–77
(2012).
5. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (interpreting
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel to guarantee effective assistance of
counsel, and setting forth a two-pronged test for reviewing counsel’s
effectiveness).
6. Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751, 1786 (1999)
(reviewing MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS (1998)).
7. See, e.g., STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM.
BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL
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guardians of rights and the rule of law. At the same time,
academics continue to favor expanding Gideon’s ambit to
guarantee lawyers in any number of civil cases implicating
fundamental interests, such as housing, employment, or child
custody.8
The expansionist dream has proven to be an unattainable
mirage. Gideon’s problems are deep, structural ones. We have
been spreading resources too thin, in the process slighting the
core cases such as capital and other serious felonies that are the
most complex and need the most time and money. A perfunctory
chat with a lawyer is little better than no lawyer at all.
Moreover, the expansionist dream treats the problem simply
as one of poverty. But, particularly in civil cases, the problem of
lawyering is a deeper one of complexity and confusion. Even
middle-class Americans have very little access to legal help,
particularly ex ante, compared with citizens in many other
countries.9 The American bar’s monopoly is a stranglehold,
preventing paralegals and other paraprofessionals from offering
low-cost assistance with routine legal issues and transactions.10
And complicated substantive, procedural, and evidentiary rules
JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE]; NAT’L RIGHT TO
COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S
CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009)
[hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED].
8. See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA BASIC PRINCIPLES OF A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
CIVIL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2012), http://pabar.org/public/committees/lspublic/
Resolutions/ABA%20Civil%20Gideon%20Basic%20Principles%20Report%20wit
h%20Rec%205_21_10.pdf (advocating for the expansion of publicly funded
counsel to include “low-income individuals . . . when basic human needs are at
stake”); Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: Lessons From Gideon
v. Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 530 (2006); Laura K. Abel,
Keeping Families Together, Saving Money, and Other Motivations Behind New
Civil Right to Counsel Laws, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2009); Russell
Engler, Reflections on a Civil Right to Counsel and Drawing Lines: When Does
Access to Justice Mean Full Representation by Counsel, and When Might Less
Assistance Suffice?, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 97, 97–98 (2010); Rachel Kleinman,
Housing Gideon: The Right to Counsel in Eviction Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1507, 1508–09 (2004); Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in
Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings: The States’ Response to Lassiter, 14
TOURO L. REV. 247, 275 (1997) (noting that courts and legislatures have become
increasingly receptive to recognizing a right to counsel in child custody cases).
9. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
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make it very difficult for citizens of ordinary intelligence to
navigate the system on their own. Our system, in short, is
overengineered, making the law too complex and legal services
too expensive for the middle class, let alone the poor.
Longer-term solutions need to move in the opposite direction.
Rather than expanding Gideon’s ambitions and appetite to civil
cases, we must shrink the universe of cases covered by Gideon to
preserve its core. That would mean excluding nonjury
misdemeanors and perhaps probationary sentences from its
ambit, for example, and thinking harder up front about which
cases need to be charged and pursued as felonies.
Especially in bench trials, there are other ways to simplify
cases to make lawyers less necessary. In particular, civil
procedure could learn from inquisitorial systems, in which
judicial officers are more active and the parties and their lawyers
need do less. Magistrates could lead investigations, discovery,
and witness examinations, relying less on the parties to
proactively frame and pursue their claims. Inquisitorial
procedure sounds like a strange transplant from civil-law
countries. But it already has parallels in administrative systems
for claiming government benefits, in which claimants commonly
pursue their claims without lawyers.11
There may also be ways to loosen the bar’s stranglehold so
that paralegals, social workers, and others can automate delivery
of legal services for routine cases. That change would resemble
what we see in health care, as nurse practitioners and physician
assistants are providing care in routine medical cases.12
In short, Gideon can work in the real world only if lawyers
drop their grandest ambitions for lawyerizing the world and
instead step back to make lawyers less necessary in the first
place. The goal should be to concentrate lawyers’ efforts on
providing quality legal services in the highest-stakes cases where
they are needed most. Quality and support matter more than
quantity alone.
Part II of this symposium Article identifies unavoidable
resource constraints as Gideon’s Achilles’ heel. Part III critiques
the wishful thinking of scholars and activists who hope to provide
11.
12.

See infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text.
See infra text accompanying note 71.
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free legal services to all poor litigants in criminal and many civil
cases. Not only is that dream politically and financially
unattainable, but it also ignores the broader problem that legal
services are too complex and expensive for middle-class
Americans as well. The sustainable solution is not to expand an
expensive entitlement, but to shrink the need, cost, and
complexity of legal services in most cases.
Part IV then begins to sketch out three clusters of more
realistic reforms. First, Gideon should apply only to the core of
felony cases tried by juries. Second, civil and minor criminal cases
should be simplified to make it easier for parties to try them pro
se, with the help of inquisitorial judges. And third, paralegals and
others could give pro se litigants lower-cost assistance if we
relaxed the bar’s monopoly on legal services. Such reforms, I
conclude, would not only be simpler, cheaper, and more politically
palatable, but also make the law more transparent and
intelligible.
II. Resource Constraints
There is not nearly enough money to appoint and support
counsel for all indigent litigants. Others at this symposium have
already covered these resource constraints in depth, so I will be
brief. Appointed defense counsel are underpaid, undersupported,
and overworked. They are often paid flat fees or low hourly rates
subject to low caps. At a rate of, say, $50 per hour subject to a
$1,000 cap, appointed counsel receives no compensation for
investing more than twenty hours in taking a case to trial. 13
These rates are often below market rates and not adjusted for
inflation. They hardly suffice to cover a law firm’s basic overhead,
including rent and secretaries, let alone compensate counsel at
anything near market rates. Funding for experts, paralegals, and
investigators is scant. Caseloads are staggering and increasing

13. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal
Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 10–11 (1997) (“[A] typical
appointed defense lawyer faces something like the following pay scale: $30 or
$40 an hour for the first twenty to thirty hours, and zero thereafter.”).

1292

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287 (2013)

far faster than the numbers of lawyers or the funding available
for them.14
The low pay and poor working conditions discourage talented
lawyers from taking on this work. Some will take it to accumulate
marketable trial experience, but they will likely leave after a few
years to cash in on that experience. Ideological or other
commitments may keep other talented lawyers in the pool, but
those who remain are likely to have fewer other options.
The only way that appointed lawyers can tread water or
break even is to plead out most of their cases very quickly,
earning a series of small fees. In the ordinary case, that means
doing little or no investigation beyond reading the police report
and charging instrument and possibly asking the prosecutor and
the client for their versions of the facts.15 Particularly when
clients are incarcerated and difficult to visit, lawyers may have
little time to meet with them until they are brought to court.
Lawyers may thus meet their clients at arraignment and
immediately urge them to plead guilty, a common strategy known
as “meet ‘em and plead ‘em.”16
The problem is especially acute when the playing field is
tilted in favor of the state. Criminal defense lawyers often face off
against better-paid assistant district attorneys, who enjoy the
support of police investigators and state forensic crime labs.17
Greater pay and economies of scale allow assistant district
attorneys to mature, gain experience, and specialize in subfields
such as capital punishment, which exacerbate the inequality.
Thus, defense lawyers are frequently outgunned.
Funding and resources are even more sparse in civil cases.
Legal aid funding is far too scant to keep up with the many
pressing civil cases, ranging from evictions of tenants to
deportations of immigrants to terminations of parental rights.
And while the bar provides pro bono services, they are not nearly
14. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 3, at 12–19 (canvassing scholarly studies that
highlight the problems of high and rising caseloads for appointed defense
counsel).
15. See Barton & Bibas, supra note 4, at 975–77.
16. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 7, at 16; Paul Marcus &
Mary Sue Backus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A National Crisis,
57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1081–84 (2006).
17. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 7, at 13–14.
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enough. Thus, the Legal Services Corporation has estimated that
existing legal services are meeting less than one-fifth of poor
people’s legal needs.18 The result is severe rationing, meaning
that claimants receive only brief advice, must wait on long
waiting lists, or receive no help at all.19
Indigent defense is not politically popular, so voters and
politicians are loath to raise taxes to support it. Rather, funds
often come from ad hoc sources, such as traffic tickets (for
criminal defense) or the interest on lawyers’ trust accounts
(IOLTA, for civil legal aid).20 These sources are not tied to rising
caseloads, expenses, or inflation, so they fail to keep pace and
often run out. Particularly because caseloads keep rising,
indigent defense funding often proves insufficient.
III. Wishful Thinking and Failed Reforms
The standard academic response to this sorry state of affairs
is to say that there ought to be a law. More specifically, scholars
and bar associations call for more lawyers, more funding, more
paralegals, more investigators, more experts—more of
everything. For nearly half a century, activists have pushed to
extend Gideon further, both to minor criminal cases and to civil
cases.21 And as the promise of effective assistance gave way to the
reality of underfunding, activists have pursued both legislation
and litigation, raising constitutional challenges to the lack of
resources.22 Leaders of the bar have likewise called on lawyers to
contribute more of their time to pro bono work.
18. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 3
(2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap
_in_america_2009.pdf.
19. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 13–14 (2004).
20. See Rodger Citron, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Case for a Structural
Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE L.J. 481, 481, 498
(1991); Hugh M. Collins, Major Improvements to the Law: Indigent Defense,
Juvenile Justice Reforms and More, 56 L.A. B.J. 268, 271 (2008) (discussing
Louisiana’s IOLTA program).
21. See Louis S. Rulli, On The Road to Civil Gideon: Five Lessons from the
Enactment of a Right to Counsel for Indigent Homeowners in Federal Civil
Forfeiture Proceedings, 19 J. L. & POL’Y 683, 685–86 (2011).
22. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A
Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J.
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These laments and jeremiads have failed to effect meaningful
reform. Most such challenges have failed, as courts view the
separation of powers as barring interference in legislative
funding decisions.23 Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected
efforts to extend the Sixth Amendment right to criminal defense
counsel into the civil arena.24 Occasionally a court will declare
indigent defense funding inadequate and order more funds or
even halt prosecutions for a time, spurring lawmakers to react.25
But such funding increases are usually one-shot responses that
fail to keep pace with inflation and caseloads. Any gains are
temporary and soon erode.
The root causes of the problem resist easy treatment. First, of
course, it is politically unpopular to spend money on providing
free lawyers, particularly to criminal defendants.26 That political
dynamic is difficult if not impossible to fix. Second, the price of
LEGIS. 487, 489 (2010) (“Congress can and should pass legislation reinforcing
the constitutional right to counsel in order to break the stalemate that has
plagued indigent defense reform.”); see also JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 7, at
103, 147 (discussing the use of litigation and legislation); Recent Legislation:
Access to Justice—Civil Right to Counsel—California Establishes Pilot Programs
to Expand Access to Counsel for Low-Income Parties—Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch.
457 (codified in scattered sections of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and Cal. Gov’t Code),
123 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1532–39 (2010) (discussing legislation providing for a
civil right to counsel in California and other jurisdictions in certain prescribed
circumstances).
23. See, e.g., In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals, 561 So. 2d
1130, 1136 (Fla. 1990) (“[I]t is not the function of this Court to decide what
constitutes adequate funding [for public defenders] and then order the
legislature to appropriate such an amount. Appropriation of funds for the
operation of government is a legislative function.”); In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53,
56 (N.Y. 1975) (“The appropriation and provision of authority for the
expenditure of public funds [for appointment of counsel] is a legislative and not
a judicial function, both in the Nation and in the State.”); In re Enrique R., 126
A.D.2d 169, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (“[The authority of the court] does not
extend to direct that such legal services be provided out of public funds in the
absence of statutory authorization for such expenditure.”).
24. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (holding that “the
Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel at
civil contempt proceedings to an indigent defendant who is subject to a child
support order, even if that individual faces incarceration . . . .”); Lassiter v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (indicating that the right to counsel
applies only when the defendant may lose his “physical liberty”).
25. See, e.g., State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 327 (La. 2005); State v. Peart,
621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1164 (Okla. 1990).
26. See Citron, supra note 20, at 498.
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legal professionals is too high because the supply of those who
can afford to do low-paying work is low. Becoming a lawyer
requires three years of law school plus cramming for and passing
a bar exam. Law school tuitions are horrifically expensive,
leaving graduates deep in debt and in need of high earnings to
repay their loans.27
Moreover, the organized bar holds a monopoly on providing
legal services. Statutes forbid unauthorized practice of law by
those who have not been licensed as lawyers.28 Courts interpret
those bans expansively, to reach many services that in other
countries are provided by paralegals, notaries, and similar
paraprofessionals, such as routine wills, divorces, and childcustody disputes.29 The bar’s cartel keeps prices high.
Those prices pose difficulties not only for poor litigants, but
also for the vast majority of middle-class people. In America,
corporations hire the bulk of lawyers’ time. Middle-class
individuals consume a much smaller share of legal services than
their compatriots in other countries—only a few hours per person
per year.30 That scarcity affects not only litigation of problems ex
post, but also seeking advice ex ante when considering a possible
contract, property division, or custody arrangement.31 Thus, as
Gillian Hadfield has argued, scholars’ exclusive focus on indigent
representation has obscured the broader problem: laws are too
27. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 107–12 (2012).
28. See Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
2581, 2581–87 (1999).
29. See Ohio State Bar Ass’n v. Burdzinski, Brinkman, Czarzasty &
Landwehr, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 372, 375 (Ohio 2006) (holding that the licensing and
regulation of lawyers has been left exclusively to the states, and that states
have broad powers to regulate professions); see also Indiana ex rel. Ind. State
Bar Ass’n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d 433, 443 (Ind. 2005) (discussing the unauthorized
practice of law in Indiana by a notary). But see Cleveland Bar Ass’n v.
CompManagement, Inc., 857 N.E.2d 95, 126 (Ohio 2006) (establishing the right
of nonlawyer respondent to provide services in workers’ compensation cases).
30. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative
Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 139–46 (2009) (offering empirical evidence that middleclass Americans do not receive the same amount of legal services as do those in
other countries).
31. See id. at 146 (noting that the average household receives “less than an
hour’s worth of legal advice or assistance in dealing with the points at which
their everyday lives intersect with the legal system”).
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complex and legal services are too expensive for ordinary people
to plan their lives and respond to crises. 32 That reality stands in
sharp contrast to our self-image as a nation that lives by the
rule of law. And there is no solving this much larger problem
through a huge new middle-class legal entitlement, particularly
given the country’s current financial straits. Neither litigation
nor largesse is promising as a way forward.
IV. Realistic Reforms
A more sustainable approach is to restructure the nature of
and market for legal services to make them less necessary and
less expensive in the first place. First, courts could shrink
Gideon to its core of felony cases involving prison sentences to
concentrate resources there instead of spreading them too thin. 33
Second, courts and legislatures could simplify procedures,
adding more inquisitorial aspects to pretrial and trial
procedures to make lawyers less necessary.34 And third,
legislatures could relax the organized bar’s monopoly, allowing
paraprofessionals and self-help assistance to reduce the need for
lawyers.35 A grand bargain to save Gideon, in short, would mean
shrinking its broad ambitions in order to concentrate and
preserve its core values.
A. Putting Gideon on a Sustainable Diet
The right to appointed counsel originated in capital cases,
in Powell v. Alabama.36 Gideon extended Powell to felonies;
Argersinger v. Hamlin37 then extended Gideon to misdemeanors,
at least those resulting in “actual imprisonment”; and Alabama

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 131–33.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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v. Shelton,38 in turn, extended Argersinger to suspended
sentences.39 That triple extension is at least one too many.
While courts can announce Sixth Amendment rights in
ringing tones, they can hardly make those rights meaningful.
Scholars have largely ignored the inevitable resource constraints
and tradeoffs. In advocating for more counsel here, there, and
everywhere, they have failed to confront the problem of scarcity,
to see that appointing lawyers here, there, and everywhere will
inevitably spread resources too thin, leaving lawyers too harried
to be effective.40
In a world of scarcity, the government must do triage. And in
that triage, the many simple cases should drop out of the system
to save time and money for the smaller number of complex ones.
Evidence at least suggests that appointing lawyers does not make
a discernible difference in misdemeanor cases.41 Careful empirical
scholars, in a randomized, controlled study, have found no
evidence that appointing lawyers makes a difference in simple
civil cases such as unemployment appeals.42 If lawyers do matter
somewhat in these cases, the effects must be too subtle to be
easily detectable.
What those cases have in common is that they are jury-free.
In simple, nonjury proceedings, parties can often articulate their
assets, employment, and needs themselves, or judges can help
them to do so on their own.43 Lawyers may be helpful, but they
38. 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002).
39. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 341–45 (1963); Argersinger, 407
U.S. at 37–38; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (limiting the
extension of Gideon to misdemeanors that could result in actual imprisonment);
Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658.
40. See Barton & Bibas, supra note 4, at 990–91 (discussing the problems
created by the paucity of resources for indigent defense counsel).
41. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 490–93 tbls.2, 3, 4, 5 & 6, 496 (2007). Even in felony
cases, there is some evidence that pro se defendants fare at least as well as
represented ones. See Indiana v. Edwards, 544 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (citing
study). This evidence, however, may be complicated by the selection effects due
to the types of persons who choose to represent themselves.
42. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized
Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does Representation (Offer and
Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2143–44, 2149–53 (2012).
43. See id. at 2174–75 (offering these as two of three plausible explanations
for the study’s empirical findings that lawyers made no difference, but
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are not essential across the board to prevent fundamental
unfairness.44 Jury trials, by contrast, typically involve more
complex rules of procedure and evidence, including motions in
limine, jury selection, sidebar conferences, and stricter
application of the rules of evidence. And jury trials correlate with
the most serious cases: crimes for which a defendant may serve
more than six months’ imprisonment.45
By contrast, the same researchers who studied
unemployment appeals have found that lawyers do improve their
clients’ outcomes in summary eviction proceedings.46 That may be
because the legal-aid provider selected cases that could benefit
from representation, the governing laws are complex, the facts
require investigation, the proceedings are aggressively
adversarial with little judicial involvement, and the other side is
almost always represented by counsel.47 Thus, there is far more
for lawyers to do in those cases and far less judicial involvement
to level the playing field.
In doing triage, battlefield doctors focus on the cases where
they can make a difference, leaving aside those whose mild
injuries do not urgently call for professional help. The same logic
applies here. Where a defendant faces charges that can result in
a felony record and serious prison time, he needs a lawyer to
negotiate a plea bargain and credibly threaten to go to a jury
trial. Where the stakes are lower and the procedures are simpler,
we must find simpler, cheaper alternatives to giving everyone a
lawyer. One could envision a grand bargain, in which legal
services were deeper but more focused, with a narrower but more
rigorously policed mandate. That approach could concentrate
funding and manpower on felony and the most serious
cautioning that the third possible explanation was a selection effect).
44. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011) (finding that the
critical question in child-support cases, the defendant’s ability to pay, can be so
“sufficiently straightforward” that pro se litigants can adequately address it,
given adequate procedures).
45. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (“[W]e have concluded
that no offense can be deemed petty for purposes of the right to trial by jury
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.”).
46. D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A
Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the
Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 926–31 (2013).
47. See id. at 924, 937–45.
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misdemeanor cases, while offering the alternatives below for
other cases. And it would counteract the temptation to lower
ineffective-assistance standards to accommodate the realities of
mass indigent defense.
There certainly is room to debate where to draw the line. One
could extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only as far as
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury, which covers all felonies
and the most serious misdemeanors. Jury trials necessitate jury
instructions, sidebar conferences, other formal motions, and
stricter enforcement of the rules of evidence, making lawyers
especially important. Or one could limit the right to all felonies,
given the stigma and consequences associated with a criminal
record. But some misdemeanors carry grave, nearly automatic
collateral consequences such as deportation, sex-offender
confinement or registration, or loss of a job or child custody.
Functionally, it is fairer to view these automatic consequences as
part of the effective punishment and to provide defense lawyers
accordingly, given the high stakes. At a minimum, then, the
automatic right to appointed counsel should not apply to
misdemeanors tried without juries that do not carry those most
serious collateral consequences. But that reform ought to go hand
in hand with the procedural simplification and alternatives to
lawyers discussed below.
There are alternatives to an automatic, across-the-board
right to counsel. Courts, for example, could apply their inherent
authority to appoint counsel in cases with particular needs for
lawyers. That should not be an ad hoc inquiry: Gideon overruled
the special-circumstances test of Betts v. Brady48 because it was
unworkable.49 But court appointment could turn on various
categories of defendants who especially need counsel, such as
those who are juveniles, mentally ill, mentally retarded, or
unable to speak English. Or legal aid societies could have a pot of
funding sufficient to represent a fraction of all misdemeanor
defendants and do triage themselves based on each case’s merit,
48. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 225
(1963).
49. Compare Betts, 316 U.S. at 462–64 (rejecting a categorical right to
appointed counsel “whatever the circumstances”), with Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343–
45 (overruling Betts and recognizing a categorical Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel).
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complexity, stakes, and need for counsel to make a difference.50
Indeed, that is what legal aid offices already do in civil cases.51
That would concentrate funds on the most needy and meritorious
cases in the pool, instead of spreading them too thin.
It is also worth thinking about the dynamic effects of moving
the right-to-counsel line. Giving prosecutors leeway to pursue
minor convictions informally, in exchange for not seeking felony
convictions or serious collateral consequences, would encourage
lesser dispositions. Of course, there is always the risk that
prosecutors will threaten heavier sentences to induce defendants
to waive their trial and counsel rights. But the incentive to stack
charges already exists, and initially filing the heavier charge
would trigger appointment of defense counsel and hence
adversarial pushback. My hope is that prosecutors might more
carefully screen their minor-case dockets, evaluating which
defendants most need felony records and major collateral
consequences even at the price of longer, more formal, adversarial
proceedings.
B. Facilitating Pro Se Litigation
A meaningful alternative to providing lawyers would be to
simplify smaller cases, which would make it easier for pro se
litigants to navigate them on their own. Some steps are obvious.
Courts need to do a far better job of translating their forms and
instructions into plain English and posting them on court
websites. They could easily streamline rules of evidence and
procedure, obviating the cumbersome hoops through which law
students learn to jump. Why, for example, must litigants mark,
50. Indeed, several prominent supporters of a civil right to counsel,
including a past president of the American Bar Association, have embraced
letting service providers do triage on the merits as an alternative to across-theboard rights to counsel. See John Pollock & Michael S. Greco, Response, It’s Not
Triage if the Patient Bleeds Out, 161 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 40, 51–52
(2012), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2012/Pollock
Greco.pdf.
51. True, the funding levels for Legal Services Corporation may well be too
low, and the fraction of cases they can cover may be too small. But that is hardly
a reason to go to the other extreme and to try to expand the fraction to 100%.
Rather, it supports trying to strike a balance somewhere in the middle.
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identify, authenticate, and only then offer exhibits into evidence?
Why apply the hearsay rules in all their abstruseness,
particularly to civil cases not covered by the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause, when so many other countries do not?
Many of these rules of procedure and evidence were developed at
least in part as mechanisms to allow judges to control juries. That
reason ceases to apply in bench trials, so the rules could be
curtailed there as well.
A more ambitious reform would be to recast minor cases from
an adversarial to an inquisitorial model.52 To oversimplify, the
classic adversarial model depends on the parties’ lawyers to
proactively frame the issues, investigate, conduct discovery,
interview and present witnesses, and the like. The classic
inquisitorial model, historically associated with civil-law
countries, empowers a judicial officer, an investigating
magistrate, to proactively frame the issues, investigate a case,
and question witnesses.53 The parties can thus be much more
passive, suggesting leads and lines of inquiry but not themselves
recruiting and questioning the witnesses.54 Because a neutral
judge proactively does much more of the work, a lawyer is far less
necessary. Likewise, law enforcement officers could be called
upon to document their work far more carefully and neutrally, to
minimize the need for the parties to investigate and challenge
52. While the Sixth Amendment requires adversarial procedures such as
jury trials and partisan defense counsel in major criminal cases, the Court has
not demanded the same procedures in trials of petty offenses. See, e.g., Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (limiting the Sixth Amendment right to
appointed counsel to criminal cases that result in “actual imprisonment”);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158–62 (1968) (extending the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial to the states but recognizing an exception for
petty offenses).
53. See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1634, 1635–37 (2009). These ideal types have been blurred in practice, as
countries on each side of the divide have borrowed from the other. Thus, it is no
longer strictly accurate to equate civil-law countries with inquisitorial systems,
although many still fall toward that end of what is now a spectrum. See id. at
1639–40.
54. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, DAVID S. CLARK & JOHN O. HALEY, THE
CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1033–34 (1994)
(describing the role of the German judge in civil procedure); John H. Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985)
(discussing the differences in the roles of judges and lawyers in the German and
American legal systems).
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live witnesses. Less adversarial investigations might even build
better and more accurate records, free of the distorting effects of
partisan witness interviews and the perverse incentives to avoid
generating documents that could be used for cross-examination.55
Inquisitorialism may sound like an exotic, foreign import, but
it already has taken root in a number of civil contexts, such as
unemployment-compensation appeals and Social Security
disability claims. “Virtually all mass justice systems have decided
that they are unable to function effectively without the activeadjudicator investigation, informal rules of evidence and
procedure, and presiding officer control of issue definition and
development that characterize an inquisitorial or examinational
approach.”56 Procedures are often informal and nonadversarial,
claimants for government benefits are typically unrepresented,
and administrative law judges (ALJs) must help claimants
develop the facts as well as adjudicate based on the evidence
presented.57
In a Social Security disability case, for example, the ALJ
“acts as an examiner charged with developing the facts.”58 ALJs
must take active roles in developing documentary and testimonial
evidence before and at hearings.59 Hearing officer staffers must
determine the issues, determine what additional documentary
evidence is needed, and prepare exhibits, interpreters, and expert
and lay witnesses as necessary. That may involve seeking
evidence directly from treating physicians or other sources, by
subpoena if necessary, or hiring medical or vocational experts.
The ALJ will admit relevant exhibits without being bound by the
rules of evidence, and may question witnesses or allow them to
55. I am grateful to Brandon Garrett for this insightful point.
56. Jerry L. Mashaw, Unemployment Compensation: Continuity, Change,
and the Prospects for Reform, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 16 (1995–1996) (noting
that mass administrative courts also “promote speed and professionalism in
claims administration”).
57. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Management Side of Due Process: Some
Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and
Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
772, 780–83 (1974) (highlighting the salient features of administrative-law
proceedings that differ from adversarial proceedings).
58. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
59. See id. (noting the active role of the ALJ in the investigative and factfinding processes).
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narrate their testimony.60 Likewise, in unemployment
compensation appeals in Massachusetts, ALJs collect relevant
documents and question witnesses.61
Another American analogue is the small-claims court, where
lawyers are not only unnecessary but in many places forbidden,
in order to keep procedures simple and level the playing field for
pro se litigants on both sides.62 Excluding lawyers keeps
proceedings streamlined and simple, while admitting them
breeds formality and complexity and tilts the playing field
against pro se litigants.63 Small-claims courts often dispense with
formal rules of procedure and evidence, making it far easier for
parties to represent themselves. Judges may act as active
inquisitors, directing questioning and assisting the parties in
gathering and admitting evidence.64 In Iowa, for instance, the
small-claims judge “swears in the parties and their witnesses and
examines them.”65
Of course, European inquisitorial systems depend in part on
careful selection and training of judges as part of a careerist civil
service. That model is not easy to transplant into elected
60. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF DISABILITY ADJUDICATION & REVIEW,
HALLEX: HEARINGS, APPEALS AND LITIGATION LAW MANUAL I-2-1-5, I-2-5-14 to
-78, I-2-6-56 to -74 (2009) http://www.socialsecurity.gov/OP_Home/hallex/
hallex.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
61. Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 42, at 2174.
62. See generally Bruce J. Graham & John R. Snortum, Small Claims
Court, 60 JUDICATURE 260 (1977); Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute
Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court, 10 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 339 (1976);
Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 6 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 293 (1981).
63. See STEVEN WELLER & JOHN C. RUHNKA, PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS ON
THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT 20–21 (1979); see also Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct.
2507, 2519 (2011) (making the same point about family court); Barton & Bibas,
supra note 4, at 983–84 (same).
64. See WELLER & RUHNKA, supra note 63, at 20–21 (noting that smallclaims courts proceed informally because the “ideal of self-representation in
small claims court can be met only if the rules of a formal civil trial are
relaxed”). Thus, experts recommend that judges in small-claims court direct the
questioning, grant continuances to permit further evidence-gathering, leave
court to view outside evidence, and receive evidence telephonically from certain
missing witnesses, and that lawyers not be permitted to question witnesses or
raise objections. Id. at 21–25.
65. Suzanne E. Elwell & Christopher D. Carlson, The Iowa Small Claims
Court: An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REV. 433, 463 (1996).
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American judiciaries run by adversarial lawyers. But states could
still pursue it, much as they have professionalized many
administrative agencies, creating civil services and training
programs. The adversarial mindset may be difficult to change,
but it is not impossible. One key change would be to ban or
severely restrict lawyers in these disputes and perhaps substitute
paraprofessionals, as the next section suggests.
C. Loosening Lawyers’ Monopoly: Permitting Paraprofessional
Practice
The American organized bar is exceptional in the degree to
which it operates as a cartel, restricting the provision of even
routine legal services by nonlawyers. Most other countries allow
paraprofessionals, ranging from notaries to paralegals to court
clerks, to provide a range of services. In five central European
countries, for example, notaries handle real estate transactions
and registries, security interests, corporate transactions from
formation through liquidation, marital property contracts and
arrangements, same-sex civil unions, uncontested divorces,
probate and intestacy proceedings, consumer financial services,
and alternative dispute resolution. In some cases, consumers may
choose whether to hire a lawyer or a notary for the same type of
transaction.66 In Germany, notaries handle real estate
conveyances, mortgages, incorporations, wills, estate and tax
planning, powers of attorney, and important contracts.67 Japan
has many kinds of legal professionals besides lawyers authorized
to litigate in court, including patent attorneys, administrative
law specialists, judicial scriveners, tax attorneys, social insurance
and labor specialists, and in-house transactional lawyers. Not all
of these professionals need to hold the equivalent of J.D.s.68
66. See Ninel Jasmine, Notaries in Europe: A Comparison Based on
Selected Countries, in 26 NOTARIES IN EUROPE—GROWING FIELDS OF
COMPETENCE 33–45 (2007).
67. See PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, THE CIVIL LAW NOTARY—
NEUTRAL LAWYER FOR THE SITUATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON PREVENTATIVE
JUSTICE IN MODERN SOCIETIES 29–30 (2010) (discussing the multifaceted
functions that notaries perform in Germany, many of which fall within the
exclusive prerogative of lawyers in the United States).
68. See Kenneth L. Port, The Spirit of Japanese Law, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL
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In handling transactions, civil-law notaries serve not as
partisan representatives of one side. Rather, they are neutral,
impartial, independent professionals who effectuate transactions
in keeping with all the parties’ intents and understandings.69 The
use of a single nonlawyer professional, whose fee may be
proportioned to the value of the transaction, holds down costs and
levels the playing field for poor, ignorant consumers. By contrast,
the American expectation that each side hire its own lawyer
favors rich, repeat players such as financial institutions with inhouse counsel.70 Thus, the American bar’s monopoly makes it
harder and more expensive for poor and middle-class Americans
to get help ex ante in structuring and understanding
transactions. As a result, poor and middle-class Americans often
go unrepresented and neglect advance planning, leading to larger
messes when crises do erupt.
In medicine, where lives are at stake, we let nurse
practitioners, midwives, paramedics, and urgent care clinics
provide certain routine services but refer more complex matters
to doctors. Indeed, many women who could afford obstetricians
choose to hire midwives instead. They trust these
paraprofessional specialists to triage and refer the fraction of
complicated births to hospitals while conducting routine
deliveries themselves more simply, cheaply, and informally.71 So
too the law could let paralegals, social workers, and court clerks
assist and advise litigants in routine criminal and civil cases, as
well as those contemplating routine wills, divorces, contracts,
corporations, and the like. Help lines and chat rooms could
automate the delivery of these services. Websites like
legalzoom.com and rocketlawyer.com, which already draft routine
wills, leases, loans, contracts, articles of incorporation, and the
STUD. L. REV. 573, 577–78 (2002) (reviewing JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF
JAPANESE LAW (1998)) (implying that only those who litigate before a court and
in-house transactional attorneys need to hold the equivalent of J.D.s).
69. See MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 67, at 30 (“When a notary is called
upon to authenticate a transaction, the notary is not representing a client . . . in
the way a lawyer would. . . . The notary’s duty is not directed toward any
particular participant, it rather extends to all of them.”).
70. See id. at 209 (noting the inherent income bias in the American system
in favor of the rich).
71. I am grateful to Robin Steinberg for this point.
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like, could do more. Do-it-yourself seminars, webinars, and
manuals could provide simple forms and clear explanations,
allowing average litigants to pursue cookie-cutter claims such as
simple divorces.
Just as medical services are trying to emphasize preventive
care to head off expensive emergency-room visits down the road,
a broader approach to legal services could emphasize proactive
planning of marital, child custody, immigration, employment,
estate, and potentially even criminal matters. Indeed, several
public defenders’ offices, such as Neighborhood Defender Services
of Harlem and the Bronx Defenders, already seek to take a more
proactive, preventive approach, emphasizing investigation and
early resolution of cases.72 Neighborhood Defender Services uses
a team approach, delegating tasks to nonlawyers, such as having
investigators handle some communication with clients.73 That
flexibility makes it easier and cheaper to represent those of
modest means.
In America, too often we act as if providing more lawyers is
an end in itself. It is not; it is simply a means of ensuring better
informed and fairer outcomes. Bringing down the price of legal
help from a luxury good to a commodity can only promote
planning, advice, and dispute resolution. That requires increasing
the supply and lowering the cost of supply, by allowing more
nonlawyer professionals to enter the field without first spending
three years and six figures to acquire a full-fledged J.D. Specialist
professionals need not acquire that breadth of knowledge if they
do not plan to be jacks of all trades. Perhaps law schools and
colleges could develop shorter paraprofessional training, akin to
paralegal courses, to prepare people to handle unemployment
compensation, disability claims, uncontested divorces, estate
planning, and similar specialized tracks. Night programs,
distance learning, accelerated courses, and other innovations
beyond traditional legal education (which ABA accreditation
rules currently forbid) could further push down the cost and thus
increase the supply of paraprofessional specialists.74 It makes no
72. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, Public
Defenders in the Neighborhood: A Harlem Law Office Stresses Teamwork, Early
Investigation (Mar. 2007), https://www/ncirs/gov/pdffiles/163061.pdf.
73. See id. at 2.
74. See AM. BAR ASS’N, 2012–2013 ABA STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE
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sense to require that legal representation always meet a Cadillaclevel standard that few can afford or receive for free. It would be
far better to offer serviceable scooters to everyone for run-of-themill cases, reserving the few appointed lawyers for those cases of
unusual complexity.
V. Conclusion
American justice is tied in a Gordian knot. In elaborating
Gideon, the Supreme Court has extended the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel far beyond the core of felony jury trials to the
much larger universe of misdemeanors even without jury trials or
immediate imprisonment. But that abstract right collides with
the political economy of indigent defense. The Court can
announce such a broad right, but it can hardly ensure that the
political branches will fund it. Thus, Gideon and its progeny rest
on no stable foundation. Legislatures chronically underfund
indigent defense and legal aid, relying on a hodgepodge of income
streams such as court costs and traffic tickets that do not keep
pace with rising caseloads. Courts are loath to order more
funding, recognizing the limits of the judicial role under the
separation of powers. And rather than embracing procedural
reforms, bar associations argue only for more lawyers. At best,
they exhort their members to offer pro bono assistance to plug the
yawning void. This state of affairs is even harder to repair in the
current economic climate, as lawyers’ incomes and employment
have stagnated or sagged, making meaningful reform even more
contentious.
The state of affairs is so bad that it may indeed be a good
time for reform. Pro se caseloads continue to climb, and judges
lack enough lawyers to appoint to these cases and funds with
which to compensate them. Moreover, in rejecting a new civilGideon right, the Supreme Court in Turner v. Rogers75
simultaneously prodded states to pursue pro se court reform as a
cheaper and sometimes fairer alternative.76 Though legislatures
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS STANDARD 301–08 (2012); TAMANAHA, supra note
27, at 11–27, 173, 176–77.
75. 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
76. Id. at 2519–20.
FOR
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and bar authorities may not pursue reform from the top down,
changes are bubbling from the bottom up, as websites and
publishers offer assistance to litigants who otherwise would have
none. There may be no one sword to slice the Gordian knot, but
perhaps a number of mice to nibble away at its strands.77 The
question is whether courts and legislatures will try in vain to
squelch these reforms, at the behest of the organized bar, or
instead bow to and embrace the reality of the situation. We may
be able to appoint fewer lawyers, giving each one the time and
resources he needs to mount a serious felony defense, yet have
more justice in the realms where lawyers are less necessary.

77.

Cf. EDGAR ALLAN POE, THE PIT AND THE PENDULUM (1850).

